George Pachymeres and the Topics

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Volume 5 of *Philosophi Byzantini*, edited by D.Z. Nikitas in 1990, is a major scholarly achievement. It contains the medieval Greek translations of Boethius' *De topicis differentiis*, one by Manuel(?) Holobolos (with the translator's scholia), and another by Prochoros Kydones. The conscientious editor has earned the gratitude of historians of logic by "prefacing" the translations with a critical edition —the first ever— of the Latin text itself, so that we can finally stop using the uncritical edition printed in Migne's *Patrologia Latina* 64. An appendix contains a text described as Γεωργίου πρωτεκδίκου καὶ δικαιοφύλακος τοῦ Παχυμέρη ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν τόπων τῶν διαλεκτικῶν, καθὼς διεῖλεν αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἰταλῶν τις καλούμενος Βοήτιος, οἳ δὴ καὶ μετηνέχθησαν πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον. Elsewhere in this issue of CIMAGL Christos Terezis provides an interpretation of the text, based on the assumption that it is an original work by Pachymeres. In this paper I shall cast doubt on that assumption.

1 Is the attribution to Pachymeres justified?

The attribution to Pachymeres rests on shaky foundations. The "title" reproduced above is the editor's conflation of the one given by ms *E*

> Γεωργίου πρωτεκδίκου καὶ δικαιοφύλακος τοῦ Παχυμέρη ἡ διαίρεσις ὅρων φιλοσοφίας

and that of the rest of the ms tradition:

> ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν τόπων τῶν διαλεκτικῶν, καθὼς διεῖλεν αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἰταλῶν τις καλούμενος Βοήτιος, οἳ δὴ καὶ μετηνέχθησαν πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον.

E is an Escorial ms from 1570 and should be given no weight. The *inscriptio* is obviously not appropriate to the text about the *topoi*, but owes its origin to the fact that this text shares its manuscript tradition with Pachymeres' Φιλοσοφία. The correct *inscriptio* is the one given by the majority of the mss, the oldest of which (*A* = Athos, Ἰβήρων 191) antedates *E* by some three centuries (Nikitas 1990: cxl).

Of course, the rejection of *E's* testimony does not necessarily imply rejecting Pachymeres' authorship. There just is no good argument for the attribution. Moreover, Nikitas (1990: cxl-cxli) informs us that in the

oldest ms (*A*) our text occupies ff. 1v-4r, while f. 5 is a type of paper found nowhere else in the ms with the recto blank and an irrelevant note on the verso. Pachymeres' *Philosophia*, written by the same hand as our text, starts only on 6v. To me this suggests that our text and the *Philosophia* were copied from different sources and only joined when the gathering containing our text was bound with the bigger work.

2 Did the author use Holobolos' translation of Boethius?

Nikitas assumed that the author of the text used Holobolos' translation of Boethius with the translator's scholia, but in good philological manner he drew attention to some cases of terminological disagreement between Holobolos and "Pachymeres". Thus the former contrasts *loci* ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν with ἔξωθεν or ἐκτὸς τούτων, while the latter uses ἐντόσθιος and ἐξωτικός[1]. This disagreement is significant. For while Holobolos just translates Boethius, the "Pachymeres" terminology matches the medieval Latin technical terms *locus intrinsecus, locus extrinsecus*.

I therefore submit the hypothesis that the "Pachymeres" text is a translation from the Latin, possibly somewhat revised by the translator.

Since the oldest ms of the Greek text is from the late thirteenth century[2] the hypothetical Latin model can be no younger. I propose to date it to the mid- or late thirteenth century.

In the following sections of this paper I shall test that hypothesis. First I shall provide my own annotated translation into Latin, then I shall analyze the work and draw conclusions.

3 Latin translation

I use my own paragraphing. Nikitas' is marked with "{§1}" through "{§6}". The purpose of the translation being to see whether the Greek may be a rendition of a Latin text from the 13th century I have aimed at producing scholastic Latin of that period while deviating as little as possible from the principle of translating *verbum ex verbo*.

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1. Nikitas 1990: cli.
2. Nikitas 1990: cxl just says "saec. XIII", but also on p. cxli provides the information that the copy of Pachymeres' *Philosophia* contained in the ms was written by the same hand. This excludes a date in the first half of the century.

3.1 Inscriptio: Divisio locorum dialecticorum sicut eos divisit quidam Italus nomine Boetius, qui quidem translati sunt in græcum idioma.[1]

3.2 {§1} Notabile: Sciendum quod cum quattuor sint prædicata, genus, proprium, definitio et accidens, unicuique idem loci conveniunt, modo arguendi[2] tantum differentes. Neque enim locus ex oppositis eodem modo ad omnia prædicata argumenta præbet neque aliorum quis.

3.3 {§2} Tres sunt species generaliter loci generalissimi, aut enim a rebus sumitur (a subiecto sc. et prædicato), et appelletur intrinsecus; aut ab eis quæ sunt extra rem, et appelletur extrinsecus; aut ex mediis et nuncupetur medius.

3.4 Schema:[3]

3.4.0 locus

3.4.1 intrinsecus

3.4.1.1 a substantia

3.4.1.1.1 a definitione

3.4.1.1.2 a descriptione

3.4.1.1.3 a nominis interpretatione

3.4.1.2 ab eis quæ circa substantiam considerantur[4]

3.4.1.2.1 a toto

3.4.1.2.1.1 universali

3.4.1.2.1.2 ex partibus composito[5]

3.4.1.2.1.3 in quantitate

3.4.1.2.1.4 in modo

3.4.1.2.1.5 in loco

3.4.1.2.1.6 in tempore

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1. A Latin text might have had "Divisio locorum dialecticorum secundum Boetium", but all the rest of 3.1 can only have been written by a Greek.

2. arguendi] τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως. A more straightforward translation into Latin would be 'argumentationis', but a Greek would be likely to choose the noun to render the gerund. Cf. τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως = 'modus essendi-in / modus inhaerendi' in 3.6.

3. I here use decimal notation to represent the tree-structure of the table of *loci*. The table follows the pattern of Latin handbooks of logic. It is almost straight out of Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* (henceforward "PH").

4. ἐκ τῶν περὶ οὐσίαν θεωρουμένων. Standard Latin form: *a concomitantibus substantiam*.

5. τοῦ ἐκ μερῶν τελειουμένου. Standard: *a toto integrali/integro*. But cf. PH 5.14 (64: 12-13): "Totum integrale est quod est *compositum ex partibus* habentibus quantitatem."

3.4.1.2.2 a parte[1]
3.4.1.2.2.1 particulari
3.4.1.2.2.2 parte
3.4.1.2.2.3 in quantitate
3.4.1.2.2.4 in modo
3.4.1.2.2.5 in loco
3.4.1.2.2.6 in tempore
3.4.1.2.3 a causa
3.4.1.2.3.1 efficienti
3.4.1.2.3.2 materiali
3.4.1.2.3.2.1 permanenti[2]
3.4.1.2.3.2.2 transeunti
3.4.1.2.3.3 formali
3.4.1.2.3.4 finali
3.4.1.2.4 ab effectu
3.4.1.2.4.1 efficientis[3]
3.4.1.2.4.2 materialis
3.4.1.2.4.2.1 permanentis
3.4.1.2.4.2.2 transeuntis
3.4.1.2.4.3 formalis

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1. The first two subdivisions ought to be *a parte subiectiva, a parte integrali*. The Greek text has τοῦ μερικοῦ, τοῦ μέρους, which hardly makes sence. The person who introduced τοῦ μερικοῦ must have done so because this is the traditional antonym of τοῦ καθόλου, which is the term found at the corresponding place of the subdivision of *locus a toto*. Similarly τοῦ μέρους may have been introduced to match τοῦ ἐκ μερῶν τελειουμένου. Cf. section 4.2, below.

2. Strictly speaking, the adjectives *permanens* and *transiens* ought to modify *materia*, not *causa materialis*. See PH 5.20 (67.22 ff.). This subdivision of *locus a causa materiali* does not occur in Boethius.

3. *efficientis* renders τοῦ ποιητικοῦ. Nikitas' text has τοῦ ποιητοῦ, which ought to render 'efficibili(s)', but this is no technical term, nor would it make sense. The whole subdivision of *locus ab effectu* (ὁ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ) is confused in a way that suggests that the translator did not quite understand his model. What we should have here is a division of *ab effectu* into *ab effectu causae efficientis / materialis / formalis / finalis*. On the most natural reading, the Greek divides it into *ab effectu efficibili / materiali / formali / efficibili efficienti*, but it is also possible to interpret the Greek division as follows: *ab effectu <causae> efficibilis / materialis / formalis / efficibilis efficientis*. Cf. the note on 3.4.1.2.4.4, below.

3.4.1.2.4.4 finalis[1]
3.4.1.2.5 a generatione
3.4.1.2.6 a corruptione
3.4.1.2.7 ab usu[2]
3.4.1.2.8 a consequentibus
3.4.2 medius
3.4.2.1 a coniugatis
3.4.2.2 a casibus
3.4.2.3 a divisione[3]
3.4.2.3.1 per negationem
3.4.2.3.2 per affirmationem
3.4.2.3.2.1 per se[4]
3.4.2.3.2.1.1 genus in species
3.4.2.3.2.1.2 totum in partes
3.4.2.3.2.1.3 a voce æquivoca in diversa significata
3.4.2.3.2.2 per accidens[5]
3.4.2.3.2.2.1 ab accidentibus in substantias
3.4.2.3.2.2.2 a substantia in accidentia
3.4.2.3.2.2.3 ab accidentibus in accidentia

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1. *finalis*] The text has the nonsensical ποιητοῦ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ. In his apparatus Nikitas correctly notes "τοῦ τελικοῦ *legendum existimandum*". Cf. the preceding footnote.
2. ἀπὸ τῆς χρήσεως. The standard Latin form is *ab usibus*.
3. For the subdivisions of *locus a divisione* see PH 5.40: "Divisionum alia est per negationem [...] Alia est divisio que non est per negationem. Et hec fit sex modis: tribus per se et tribus per accidens. Primo generis in species [...] Secundo totius in partes integrales [...] Tertio vocis in significationes [...] Trium per accidens una est subiecti in accidentia [...] Secunda accidentis in subiecta [...] Tertia accidentis in accidentia". Most of this system is presented in Boethius, *Top. Diff.* 2.9, but he does not there use the *per se/per accidens* distinction. See further in section 4.2, below.
4. The correct subdivisions of the *locus a divisione per se* are: *a divisione (1) generis in species, (2) totius in partes, (3) vocis in proprias significationes.*
5. Standard for the three subdivisions are: *subiecti in accidentia, accidentis in subiecta, accidentis in accidentia.* The Greek text has ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων εἰς οὐσίας, ἀπὸ οὐσίας εἰς συμβεβηκότα, ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων εἰς συμβεβηκότα.

3.4.3 extrinsecus[1]
3.4.3.1 ab oppositis[2]
3.4.3.1.1 a relativis
3.4.3.1.2 a contrariis
3.4.3.1.2.1 immediatis
3.4.3.1.2.2 mediatis
3.4.3.1.3 a privatione et habitu
3.4.3.1.4 a contradictione
3.4.3.2 ab eo quod est magis et minus[3]
3.4.3.3 a similibus
3.4.3.4 a similiter se habentibus[4]
3.4.3.5 a transumptione
3.4.3.6 ab opinione [aut] alicuius sapientis[5]

3.5 *{Notula incertae sedis}*[6] Argumentorum unumquodque videre oportet unde trahitur[7] et quid monstrat et quomodo, i.e. locum, conclusionem et formam rationis. Modi demonstrativi[8] sunt 4: syllogismus, inductio, enthymema et exemplum. Amplius, si sophistice arguat, quomodo.[9] Hæc autem manifesta resolventibus.[10]

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1. The subdivision of extrinsic *loci* follows the order of PH, with *ab auctoritate* last, as against that of Boethius.
2. The standard formulations of the subspecies of *locus ab oppositis* are *a relative oppositis, a contrariis, a privative oppositis, a contradictorie oppositis.*
3. Standard: a *maiori/minori.*
4. Standard: a *proportione.*
5. ἀπὸ δόξης ἤ τινος σοφοῦ. The ἤ serves no function. It is probably an intruder; loss of a second disjunct — e.g., ἤ <κρίσεως> — is less likely. The Latin standard name is *ab auctoritate*, but cf. PH 5.36: "Auctoritas, ut hic sumitur, est *iudicium sapientis* in sua scientia."
6. In the mss after *loci medii.* See apparatus in Nikitas 1990: 234
7. trahitur] ὁρμᾶται. The Greek text uses a term which had been traditional in this context since antiquity. Latin texts use 'trahitur', 'sumitur' and other words.
8. demonstrativi] ἀποδεικτικοί. This does not make sense; the word needed is *argumentationis* or *arguendi.* Cf. PH 5.3: "Argumentationis quatuor sunt species: sillogismus, inductio, entimema, exemplum."
9. Amplius — quomodo] ἔτι δέ, εἰ σοφίζεται, τίνι τρόπῳ. This makes no sense in the context, but sense can be restored if it is made to continue the first period ("Argumentorum — formam rationis"). Properly, the misplaced note about the four types of argument ought to precede the one about what to look for in an argument.
10. Haec — resolventibus] This is a desperate attempt to guess at the sense behind the nonsensical δῆλα δὲ ταυτὶ ἀναλυομένων.

3.6 {§3} Unumquodque quattuor prædicatorum et inesse debet subiecto et taliter inesse,[1] ut genus non solum inesse oportet subiecto sed et ut genus; et sic de aliis. His ita se habentibus oportebat locos in duo divisos esse et hos simpliciter inesse aut non monstrare, qui quidem communes essent ad omnia prædicata, hos iterum in quattuor divisos esse et unamquamque partium modum essendi-in[2] uniuscuiusque prædicatorum monstrare. Oportet etiam locos fortasse secundum divisionem procedere, sed non ita indefinite.

{§4} Quare videretur fortasse Aristoteles dupliciter peccasse:

(1) primo quia locos ad accidens quandoque proprios dicit[3] assignare, ut cum dicit "propria autem ad unumquodque determinatorum generum assignata methodo facile ex his quæ circa unumquodque convenientibus exitus propositi fiet"[4], quandoque eosdem iterum communes esse dicit ad omnia prædicata, tum cum dicat "Non lateat autem nos quoniam quæ ad proprium et genus et accidens omnnia et ad diffinitiones conveniet dici" etc.[5], tum cum dicit in libro de definitione "Utrum autem inest[6] genus

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1. inesse] ὑπάρχειν. This is a standard equivalence. An alternative Latin equivalent would be *inhaerere*.

2. modum essendi-in] τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὑπάρξεως. For the term *modus essendi-in*, cf. Brito 1978: 28. The Greek might also cover the synonymous *modus inhaerendi*.

3. dicit] φησίν. This is probably an error for *docet*, the latter word having been misread by a Latin scribe or by the translator himself.

4. facile — fiet] ῥᾷον — γένοιτο ἄν. I have followed Boethius' translation (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3: 12.8-10 *Propria autem in unoquoque determinatorum generum assignata methodo facile ex his quae circa unumquodque convenientibus exitus propositi fiet*). But the Greek version is not a re-translation of Boethius into Greek. If it were, *facile fiet* would surely have become ῥᾳδίως γενήσεται, and one would also expect ἐν ἑκάστῳ for *in unoquoque* instead of the πρὸς ἕκαστον actually found. The formulations used in the quotation presuppose acquaintance with the original text of Aristotle. The only deviation from Aristotle (*Top.* 1.5.102b38-103a1) is πρὸς ἕκαστον for καθ' ἕκαστον.

5. Arist. Top. 1.6.102b27-29. The Greek text faithfully reproduces the Aristotelian original, following a branch of the tradition that mentions γένος before ἴδιον, whereas the branch followed by Boethius in his Latin translation has the opposite order: *Non lateat autem nos quoniam quae ad proprium et genus et accidens omnia et ad diffinitiones conveniet dici* (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3: 11.22-23.

6. inest] ὑπάρχειν. The infinitive is just tolerable in the Greek, assuming that πότερον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ γένος τῷ εἴδει ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον is indirect speech, governed by ὅταν λέγῃ. But ὑπάρχει would be preferable.

176

speciei ab his qui sunt ad accidens locis considerandum."[1]

(2) Item, peccatum videtur non a divisione de necessitate ad multitudinem locorum venisse, sed simpliciter sic editos esse sine omni ordine.[2] De quibus ita se habentibus, ut videtur,[3] numquam fieret scientia.

Hæc duo maxime Aristoteli obicere videretur quis.

{§5} (Ad 1) Ad primum eorum dicimus quod loci ad accidens inesse solum aut non in subiecto prædicatum negotiantur[4]; qui vero ad reliqua sunt quod inest nullo modo disputant[5], utrum autem genus ut genus, aliud ut proprium, aliud ut definitio assignata sint, hoc monstrare volunt aut contrarium, i.e. non sic inesse.

Sed iterum deficere viderentur qui sunt ad accidens, i.e. qui modum essendi-in accidentis manifestant.

Sed nullo modo. Nam et probato quod accidens inest subiecto, dubitato vero quod ut accidens inest, loci qui sunt ad alia prædicata utiles sunt, destructivi scilicet; si demonstretur inesse subiecto per eos qui sunt ad accidens, non autem ut genus neque ut proprium, neque vero ut definitio, demonstratum erit quod ut accidens inest. Nam hoc dicebatur

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1. πότερον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ γένος τῷ εἴδει ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον. This is a false quotation. The formula ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον occurs in Arist. *Top.* 5.1.139a37 and is rendered *ex his qui sunt ad accidens locis considerandum* by Boethius (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3: 114.15-16).

2. ordine] ἀκολουθίας. Elsewhere I use *ordo* to render τάξις. *consecutio* or *consequentia* would be more literal renditions of ἀκολουθία, but neither would be appropriate in the sense of "logical order". If the Greek is a translation from Latin the translator was capable of picking different Greek words for one Latin term according as the context demanded.

3. ut videtur] ὡς δοκοῦσιν. The plural makes little sense; it may represent a 'videtur' misread as 'videntur'.

4. negotiantur] πραγματεύονται. It is not entirely clear to me which Latin word might correspond to the Greek.

5. disputant] διαλέγονται. The Latin sounds unidiomatic, the Greek less so.

accidens esse, quod neque definitio neque genus neque proprium est, inest autem rei. Ut secundum hoc bene se haberent.

(Ad 2) Inordinatio vero eorum quæ videtur quippe nullum ordinem[1] de necessario manifestans et continuationem minime est fortuita et ex automato, quamquam videtur. Nam quod Philosophus via quadam usus ad inventionem horum venerit manifestat in prima incisione eiusdem libri[2] quando de propositione tractans dicit "utrum autem secundum veritatem sic se habeat vel non in his quæ de contrario dicuntur dicetur".[3] Quare manifestum est quod antequam scripserit quæ scripturus esset clare scivit. Hoc etiam manifestius fecit in fine septimæ incisionis[4] sic dicens: "Loci ergo per quos ideonei erimus ad singula problematum argumentari, pæne sufficienter enumerati sunt".[5] Nam si non ad definitos locos spectaret, non intelligeret eos sufficenter enumeratos esse. Quod vero ratione divisiva eos scripserit manifestum est. Quod autem hanc methodum non in his quæ scripsit edidit, manifestum et illud. Non autem alienum a suo more faciebat. Nam etiam præter alia quæ scriptis eius obscuritatem ingerunt, illud maximum efficiens obscuritatis, omnino non revelare rationem divisionis et ordinis, quam ille quidem optime noverat et qua utens scribebat, apud se vero occultam servabat nullo

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1. nullum ordinem] μηδεμίαν ἀκολουθίαν. For my use of *ordo* for ἀκολουθία as well as for τάξις, see an earlier footnote.

2. in prima incisione eiusdem libri] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τμήματι τοῦ αὐτοῦ βιβλίου. The Greek text raises the following problems: (1) The reference is to Book I, not to Chapter I of the *Topics*. Subdivisions of *Peri hermeneias* and *Prior Analytics* were traditionally called τμήματα (Lat.: incisiones), but it does not seem to have been Byzantine custom to call the books of the *Topics* τμήματα, nor are they ever called *incisiones* in Latin. (2) The phrase τοῦ αὐτοῦ βιβλίου presupposes that the *Topics* has already been named, but in fact it has not been mentioned. Perhaps the Greek represents the translator's difficulty with how to render the Latin idiom *in primo huius* = "in Book I of the work we are commenting on." If so, the *dubitatio* derives from a scholium or commentary on the Aristotele's *Topics*.

3. The Greek text presupposes acquaintance with the original's (Arist. *Top.* 1.10.104a31-33) ῥηθήσεται for Boethius' *ostendetur* (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-5: 16.17).

4. incisionis] τμήματος. The reference is to the end of *Topics* Book VII, and the use of the word τμῆμα thus raises the same problem here as a few lines earlier.

5. Arist. *Top.* 7.5.155a37-38. My text above is Boethius' translation (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3: 155.11-12). The Greek text of the quotation (Nikitas 1990: 238.4-6) is a *verbatim* reproduction of Aristotle's words.

modo aliis per litteram manifestans. Ecce in Prædicamentis decem gener-
alissima enumerat, rationem vero divisionis et ordinis non addidit.
Iterum in divisione eorundem in suas species sic velate docuit. In libro
Periermenias vero qualis confusio non videretur esse considerationum?[1]
Quæ necessitas divisionis manifestatur in opere[2] ut sciatur quod com-
pletum est et neque superfluum neque deminutum? Et simpliciter ubique
talis est. Non est ergo mirum si et in Topicis suum morem servavit.

{§6} Verumtamen, etsi Aristoteles hoc occultavit, nullo modo viros
sapientes latere potuit, nedum Boethium,[3] cuius divisio antea scripta est.
Si vero hic unicuique prædicatorum propriam assignat methodum,
Boethius autem unam omnibus quattuor convenientem,[4] non propter hoc
oportet dicere quod non sunt idem. Tantum autem plus Aristoteles facit
ut et ad genera prædicatorum unumquemque locum applicat[5] et magis
particulariter[6] unumquemque certificat definitione[7] et exemplo.

4 Analysis of the text

The text printed by Nikitas consists of three main parts: a note about
arguments, a table of *loci*, and a *dubitatio* about Aristotle's division of
loci.

4.1 The note about arguments.

My item 3.5 is a note that in the manuscripts follow the table's sec-
tion on middle *loci*. Nikitas does not print it in his main text but only in
the apparatus (1990: 234-5). The note falls in two parts, with the follow-
ing contents:

a. (1) Concerning any argument one should try to determine its *locus*,
its conclusion, and its formulation. (2) Besides, if presented with a

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1. considerationum] θεωρημάτων. *conclusionum* might also be considered.

2. opere] συγγράμματι. It is not obvious which Latin word the Greek one is most
   likely to render.

3. nullo modo - Boethium] ἄλλους τε σοφοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸν Βοηθόν. The
   Greek is idiomatically correct and can scarcely be a word-by-word translation from
   Latin.

4. convenientem] ἐφαρμόττουσαν

5. applicat] ἐφαρμόττει; *adaptat* would be a closer Latin equivalent, but while not
   impossible it seems less idiomatic.

6. magis particulariter] λεπτομερέστερον. There is nothing strange about the Greek,
   but it is not obvious which Latin word or phrase it may render.

7. definitione] λόγῳ.

sophistical argument, one should analyse it to pinpoint exactly how it is sophistic.

b. There are four types of argument: syllogism, induction, enthymeme and example.

As preserved, the text is in disorder, (b) having been squeezed in between (a1) and (a2). In some — Greek or Latin — ancestor of the archetype of the Greek mss the logically independent, though thematically related notes (a1) and (a2) must have been written in a way that misled a reader.

Nikitas (l.c.) suggests that 3.5 originated as a scholium on the word ἐπιχειρήματα in the Greek translation of Boethius' *De topicis differentiis* 1.2. This is not impossible, but a Latin origin is quite as plausible. Ultimately a note of this sort, at least (a1), is occasioned by the Boethian term *argumentum/ἐπιχείρημα*, but it does not belong more to *De topicis differentiis* than to Aristotle's *Topics* or to a summulistic *tractatus de locis*. Cf. in particular the beginning of Peter of Spain's treatise *De locis* (PH 5.2-3).

It is easy to translate both parts of the note into idiomatically correct scholastic Latin, containing the technical term *forma rationis* "the form(ulation) of the argument". There are only three difficulties: (i) ὀρμᾶται, (ii) *τρόποι ἀποδεικτικοί* and (iii) *ἀναλυομένων*. (i) makes good sense, but it is not obvious what Latin word it might render. (ii) makes no sense. The text is not about types of demonstration but about types of argument. The parallel text in PH 5.3 says *Argumentationis quatuor sunt species*. Another acceptable Latin term would be *modi arguendi*, which has no standard Greek equivalent. The nonsensical Greek may represent a translator's unsuccesful attempt to render this term. (iii) is barely comprehensible. Incomplete understanding of a Latin text is one possible cause of the problem.

I conclude that 3.5 is probably a translation from the Latin, done by a man with an imperfect knowledge of scholastic logic but with a good knowledge of traditional Greek terminology (ὀρμᾶται).

4.2 The table of loci.

§2 (= 3.3 - 3.4 in my Latin translation) is a table of *loci* derived from Peter of Spain or some similar source. It contains terms and divisions characteristic of the summulistic tradition of mature Latin scholasticism and not obtainable from Holobolos. I am not aware of any Greek translation of Peter of Spain (or of any other similar work) before that

by George Scholarios (= Gennadios) from the early fifteenth century.[1] "Pachymeres" does not depend on Scholarios, for (a) the oldest mss of his text antedate Scholarios, (b) his rendition of Latin terminology differs considerably from Scholarios'. Hence we are left with two possibilities: either the table was composed by a Greek as a result of his reading a summulistic *Tractatus de locis*, or it is simply a translation of a Latin table.

The table contains a number of errors and infelicities some of which could hardly have been committed by anybody who was working with the *Tractatus de locis* of a *Summulae* at his elbow. They rather suggest that all the translator looked at was a Latin table of the *loci*. This may have had some flaws, but the translator added new ones because he simply did not know all the Latin technical terms. It is not impossible to imagine a Latin table with *a causa materiali permanenti* instead of the correct *a causa materiali in materia permanenti*. But it is very hard to imagine a Westerner who would commit the sort of error that occurs in "Pachymeres'" division of *locus a toto* and *locus a parte*. The Latin model probably divided as follows:

3.4.1.2.1 A toto	3.4.1.2.2 A parte
3.4.1.2.1.1 universali	3.4.1.2.2.1 subiectiva
3.4.1.2.1.2 integro (ex partibus composito)	3.4.1.2.2.2 integrali

The translator, I submit, did not know the terms *totum universale / integrale* (or: *integrum*) and *pars subiectiva/integralis*, but he assumed that the *differentiae* of *totum* and *pars* must be antonyms. So he introduced "particular" to match "universal" and "part" to match "whole = composed of parts", the result being as follows:

3.4.1.2.1 ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου	3.4.1.2.2 ἐκ τοῦ μέρους
3.4.1.2.1.1 τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ καθόλου	3.4.1.2.2.1 τοῦ μερικοῦ
3.4.1.2.1.2 τοῦ ἐκ μερῶν τελειουμένου	3.4.1.2.2.2 τοῦ μέρους

The table's treatment of *locus a divisione* also calls for comments. The first subdivision into *per negationem / per affirmationem* is based on Boethius' remark that "omnis divisio vel negatione fit vel partitione" (*Top. Diff.* 2.9, Nikitas 1990: 42.7-8), but *partitio* (μερισμός in Holobolos' translation, Nikitas 1990: 124) has disappeared in favour of *affirmatio*. Peter of Spain says *per negationem / non per negationem*,

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1. Scholarios' translation of Peter of Spain's *Summulae* was edited by Jugie in 1936. The *Tractatus de locis* is found in Jugie 1936 at pp. 317-331.

which is superior both to Boethius' and to the table's formulation. The latter seems to be yet another case of selecting an antonym of the term used in the first leg of the division.

The subdivision of the second type of division into *per se* and *per accidens* does not occur in Boethius *l.c.*, but it does occur in Peter of Spain [ultimate source: Boethius, *De divisione*, PL 64: 877B].

The tables shares the three subdivisions of *divisio per se* with Peter of Spain. They come from Boethius' *Top. Diff.*, but the table uses somewhat strange names for them. The correct formulation is *a divisione (1) generis in species, (2) totius in partes, (3) vocis in proprias significationes*. The Greek text has ἀπὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως (1) τὸ γένος εἰς εἴδη, (2) τὸ ὅλον εἰς μέρη, (3) ἀπὸ ὁμωνύμου φωνῆς εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα. Neither the use of the nominative instead of the genitive in (1) and (2), nor the addition of ἀπὸ ὁμωνύμου in (3) stems from Holobolos' translation, which also faithfully renders Boethius' *proprias* with οἰκεῖα (Nikitas 1990: 124.23).

The three subdivisions of *divisio per accidens* come from Boethius' text, and also occur in Peter of Spain. Once again the table is somewhat strange in that substance (οὐσία) has replaced Boethius' *subiectum*, but this time the table agrees with Holobolos (Nikitas 1990: 124.24-25). He, however, cannot be held responsible for the table's (διαίρεσις) ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων and ἀπὸ οὐσίας instead of the expected (διαίρεσις) συμβεβηκότων/οὐσίας.

Most of the peculiar formulations in the six types of division also occur in Nicephorus Blemmydes' *Epitome Logica* 2.1 (PG 142: 701):

Πᾶν πρᾶγμα ἢ διαιρετόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδιαίρετον. Τὸ δὲ διαιρετὸν ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διαιρεῖται ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ τὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διαιρούμενον ἢ ὡς πρᾶγμα διαιρεῖται ἢ ὡς φωνή. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς πρᾶγμα, γίνεται ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἴδη διαίρεσις, καὶ ἀπὸ εἴδους εἰς ἄτομα, καὶ ἀπὸ ὅλων εἰς μέρη, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν. Ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πράγματα διαιροῦνται. Εἰ δὲ ὡς φωνή, γίνεται ἡ διαίρεσις <u>ἀπὸ ὁμωνύμου φωνῆς εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα</u>. Τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διαιρούμενον τοιαύτην ἐπιδέχεται διαίρεσιν· τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ ὡς <u>ἀπὸ οὐσίας εἰς συμεβηκότα</u> ἔχει τὴν διαίρεσιν, ἢ <u>ὡς ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων εἰς συμβεβηκότα</u>, ἢ <u>ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων εἰς συμβεβηκότα</u>.

Blemmydes' logic has a peculiar structure, in the main as follows: (a) Definition, (b) Division, (c) *Isagoge*, (e) *Categories*, (f) *Peri Hermeneias*, (g) *Analytica Priora*, (h) *Sophistici Elenchi*. (c-h) are based

on the reduced *Organon* to which most Greeks confined their attention. The surprise is the occurrence of items (a-b). I used to think that Blemmydes drew on the same late ancient tradition that inspired Marius Victorinus' *De definitionibus* and Boethius' *De divisione*. I now think it merits investigation whether he may not simply have had some knowledge of the two Latin *opuscula*.

Anyhow, Holobolos and the table join Blemmydes in talking about division of substance into accidents and vice versa rather than of subject into accidents. The table diverges from Holobolos but joins Blemmydes in using ἀπό-phrases, in including the word ὁμωνύμου, and in having διάφορα for the expected οἰκεῖα. It looks as if the table was produced from a Latin model, but by someone who looked up the relevant place in Blemmydes (or some Greek work related to his) and picked some formulations from there. The same source may have seduced Holobolos into translating *subiectum* by οὐσία.

I conclude that the table is a translation from the Latin, done by a person who was more familiar with Greek than with Latin logic.

4.3 The *dubitatio*.

Nikitas' §§1 and 3-6 (3.2 & 3.6 in the Latin translation above) form another unity. It is a *dubitatio* about the division of *loci* in Aristotle's *Topics*. Two objections are raised against Aristotle:

Objection 1. There are four types of predicate (genus, proprium, definition, accident). Each type of predicate must (i) belong *simpliciter* to its subject and (ii) belong *taliter* to it (i.e. as its genus or species etc.). This would seem to call for two main types of *loci*, and a fourfold subdivision of the second sort, as follows

1. *Loci* helpful for proving that a predicate belongs *simpliciter* to some subject.
2. *Loci* helpful for proving that that a predicate belongs *taliter* to some subject.
2.1 That it belongs as the subject's genus
2.2 That it belongs as the subject's proprium
2.3 That it belongs as the subject's definition
2.4 That it belongs as the subject's accident

Any *locus* of type 1 would be "common" in the sense of being applicable no matter which of the four types of predicate one is asking about, whereas a *locus* of type 2 would be "proper" to one type of predicate.

Aristotle, however, does not consistently observe the distinction between type 1 and type 2. On one occasion he characterizes *loci ad accidens* as common, on other occasions as proper.

Objection 2. Aristotle presents no reasoned division to show the *sufficientia* (exhaustivity and non-redundancy) of his set of *loci*. But, if there is no system there is no scientific knowledge. Hence the *scientia de locis* is an illusion.

Refutation of 1. *Loci ad accidens* can be used to show whether some predicate belongs at all to the subject. If a predicate has passed the test and one also wants to know in which way it belongs, no special test by means of accident-*loci* is needed. Testing with the *loci* for genus, proprium and definition will suffice; if the predicate fails all three types of test, it is an accidental predicate. So, Aristotle's fourfold division is sound.

Refutation of 2. There is an underlying system of which Aristotle was perfectly aware, but true to his habitual obscurity he did not reveal what the system was. This did not prevent Boethius from discovering it. Admittedly, Boethius neglects the four-predicate approach, but this only means that his system is less detailed than Aristotle's, not that it is radically different.

The general structure of the *dubitatio* is one well known from Western scholastic literature, but not current among Byzantine students of Aristotle. At the beginning of a course on some authorial text doubt is raised about some fundamental classification of the work. Is Porphyry's list of exactly five predicables really justified? Is Aristotle really right in operating with exactly ten categories? — and so on. Reasons are given for rejecting the author's classification, only to be rebutted immediately afterwards. In objection (2) of our *dubitatio* the attack on Aristotle's classification is connected with another typical scholastic question: "Is it possible to have scientific knowledge about the subject dealt with by the *auctor*?"

The translation into Latin yields some typical scholastic idioms and technical terms, such as *videretur dupliciter pecasse, Ad primum istorum dicimus/dicendum* and *modus essendi in,* but sometimes it is difficult to guess what Latin may underlie the Greek and in a few cases the Greek certainly cannot be a *verbatim* rendition of a Latin text. This is notably the case with some quotations of Aristotle.

I conclude that the *dubitatio* is probably a somewhat free translation from the Latin done by a Greek so well acquainted with the *Organon* that he knew how to check the Aristotelian quotations of his Latin model against the Stagirite's Greek text.

5. General Conclusion.

All three ingredients of the text edited by Nikitas show signs of being translated from the Latin. At the end of the *dubitatio* (Nikitas §6) there is a reference to the table (τὸν Βοηθόν, οὗ γέγραπται ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν). No reference links the note about arguments to the other two items, but it fits into the context, and so the translator probably found all the material in one manuscript. This may have beek a book whose main content was Peter of Spain or some similar sum of logic, but it is equally possible that the translator used a Latin manuscript of the *Organon* in which a couple of — originally blank — pages before the beginning of the *Topics* had been used to list the types of argument, sketch the "Boethian" system of *loci*, and raise the *dubitatio* about Aristotle's systematics as compared to Boethius'. The ms may have been messy (little logical notes are often transmitted in a less than tidy way), but the intended order probably was:

i) The note about arguments (my 3.5), first part (a), then part (b).
   Cf. PH 5.2-3.
ii) The table
iii) The *dubitatio*.

The organization, contents and terminology of the text is consistent with a thirteenth-century origin. I find nothing redolent of the twelfth century, and nothing points to a time after 1300, though the text could in principle be a conservative product from the early decades of the fourteenth century. But this mere possibility gives no reason do doubt the dating of the earliest Greek manuscript to the late thirteenth century.

The translator was not very well acquainted with scholastic logic, but he knew the terminology of Greek logic and he knew how to look up things in Aristotle's *Organon*. Whoever the translator was, he was one of those late Byzantines whose eyes had been opened to the riches of Latin scholasticism and who tried to transcend the traditional isolation of Greek scholars from those of other language-areas.

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